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Abstract
Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeo® between secrecy and operational
e±ciency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to deter-
mine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into
account. In this paper this framework is put to the test by applying it to the 2002 Jemaah
Islamiyah Bali bombing. It is found that most aspects of this covert network can be explained
by the theoretical framework. Some interactions however provide a higher risk to the network
than others. The theoretical framework on covert networks is extended to accommodate for
such heterogeneous interactions. Given a network structure the optimal location of one risky
interaction is established. It is shown that the pair of individuals in the organization that should
conduct the interaction that presents the highest risk to the organization, is the pair that is the
least connected to the remainder of the network. Furthermore, optimal networks given a single
risky interaction are approximated and compared. When choosing among a path, star and ring
graph it is found that for low order graphs the path graph is best. When increasing the order
of graphs under consideration a transition occurs such that the star graph becomes best. It is
found that the higher the risk a single interaction presents to the covert network the later this
transition from path to star graph occurs.
Keywords: covert networks, terrorist networks, heterogeneity, game theory, information, secrecy.
JEL classi¯cation: C50, C78.
1 Introduction
Recently an increasing interest in the application of methods from social network analysis to the
study of terrorism can be observed. For instance in counterinsurgency social network analysis is
recognized to be one of the most important tools to describe e®ects of the operational environment
and to evaluate the threat (Petreaus 2007). Moreover, it is realized that methods from several
mathematical disciplines are valuable in analyzing covert networks. Sageman (2004) discusses the
use of applying the network paradigm (clustering, small-world phenomena, etc.) to analyze terror
networks. Social network analysis of speci¯c terror events are available, although not abundant, see
for instance Koschade (2005, 2006). There is something to be gained by applying and extending
ideas from graph theory and game theory in the analysis of covert networks. Social and a±liation
network analysis as well as spatiotemporal point pattern analysis are valuable mathematical meth-
ods that certainly warrant further exploration in the analysis of subversive activities, terrorism and
guerrilla warfare.
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1Terrorism is not a topic that is easily researchable on the basis of practical data because of
the clandestine nature of terrorist groups (Johnson 2007). Therefore theoretical frameworks that
describe how rational actors should behave in trying to attain certain strategic goals can provide
insights into the functioning of terrorist groups. For instance, the strategic interaction between
economic actors, within an explicitly given network structure, is modeled in Jackson (2001). In
this paper we present and extend theoretical insights into the dilemma of secrecy and operational
control in covert networks. In Lindelauf et al. (2008) a theoretical framework on the homogeneous
communication structure of covert networks is established. A secrecy measure and information
measure are de¯ned and the Nash bargaining criterion is adopted to determine optimal covert
networks of given order. Several scenarios are analyzed. First, under the assumption of uniform
individual exposure probability and high link detection probability it is shown that a star graph is
optimal. However, on the assumption of low link detection probability it is shown that the complete
graph is optimal. Second, if the exposure probability of individuals depends on their centrality with
regard to information exchange it is shown that cellular networks are optimal.
This paper puts the theoretical framework on homogeneous covert networks to the test by
applying it to the 2002 Jemaah Islamiyah Bali bombing. The theoretical framework does well in
explaining most aspects of the network structure that Jemaah Islamiya adopted to carry out this
attack. In addition however it is recognized that the nature of interaction between entities in a
covert organization is not necessarily homogeneous. Hence the theoretical framework is extended to
incorporate heterogeneity of the network. The most basic heterogeneous network is that in which
all but one interaction present similar risks to the organization. The optimal pair of individuals
that should conduct the interaction that presents the highest risk to the organization turns out
to be the pair that is the least connected to the remainder of the network. In addition, when
choosing among a path, star and ring graph with a single high risk interaction pair it is found that
for low order graphs the path graph is best. Increasing the order a transition occurs such that the
star graph becomes best. It is found that the higher the risk a single interaction presents to the
covert network the later this transition from path to star graph occurs. Furthermore, approximate
optimal networks given a single risky interaction are determined by simulation.
This paper is organized as follows. After presenting some graph theoretical preliminaries in
section 2 secrecy and communication in networks and the main theoretical ¯ndings of Lindelauf
et al. (2008) will be reviewed in section 3. The Jemaah Islamiyah 2002 Bali bombing operation
will be discussed in section 4 and compared to the theoretical results on optimal covert networks.
In section 5 the theoretical framework is extended to incorporate the heterogeneity of interaction
between entities in covert networks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present graph theoretical preliminaries. A good general overview is given by
Bollobas (1998).
A graph g is an ordered pair (V;E), where V represents the ¯nite set of vertices and the set
of edges E is a subset of the set of all unordered pairs of vertices. An edge fi;jg connects the
vertices i and j and is also denoted by ij. The order of a graph is the number of vertices jV j and
the size equals its number of edges jEj. The set of all graphs of order n and size m is denoted
with G(n;m). The set of graphs of order n is denoted by Gn. In this paper we are only interested
in connected graphs because we study the organizational form of groups in which the actions of
individuals are coordinated. Therefore each graph under consideration is assumed to be connected.
The degree of a vertex is the number of vertices to which it is connected. We denote the degree
2of vertex i in graph g by di(g). A graph is called k-regular if all vertices have degree k. A star
graph on n vertices is denoted by gn
star. We denote a ring graph of order n by gn
ring and a path
graph of order n by gn
path. The complete graph of order n is denoted by gn
comp. See Figure 1 for an
illustration of these graphs of order 5. The shortest distance (in number of edges one has to travel)
between vertex i and j is called the geodesic distance between i and j. The geodesic distance
between vertices i;j in g is denoted by lij(g). Clearly, lij(g) = lji(g). We will write lij instead of
lij(g) if there can be no confusion about the graph under consideration. The total distance T(g) in






j2V lij(g). The diameter D(g) of a graph
g = (V;E) is de¯ned to be the maximum over the geodesic distances between all pairs of vertices,
i.e. D(g) = max(i;j)2V £V lij(g). Furthermore, we assume without loss of generality that n ¸ 3. We
denote the set of `neighbors at distance k' of vertex i by ¡i;k(g), i.e., ¡i;k(g) = fj 2 V jlij(g) = kg.
Figure 1: Star graph of order 5 (top left), ring graph of order 5 (top right), path graph of order 5
(down left) and complete graph of order 5 (down right).
3 Secrecy and Communication in Homogeneous Covert Networks
Covert networks are constantly challenged with the tradeo® between secrecy on one side and op-
erational capability on the other side. For instance, consider the failed Israeli covert operation in
Egypt known as Operation Susannah (Johnson 2007). Israel's Military Intelligence decided to set
up a network of sleeper agents in Egypt which was activated in 1954 to prevent the British with-
drawal from Egypt. However, after the arrest of a suspect names of accomplices of the operation
were found in his apartment and the network was subsequently dismantled. This example shows
that every member of a covert network presents a risk to the secrecy of the network in the sense
that upon his exposure potentially others are exposed.
Another example of a covert network that was exposed is the following. During the 1950's a
group of lawyers and legal experts that turned against the communist regime in East Berlin were
selected by the CIA to be converted to an underground armed resistance group consisting of cells
of 3 individuals each (Weiner 2007). However, the network topology of this organization equalled
that of a complete graph (the worst possible in the sense of secrecy) because all individuals were
acquainted with each other. Upon the exposure of one network member the Soviets discovered and
arrested all other members. The operation was a failure.
Another more recent example is that of Al Qaeda. It is currently widely known that Al Qaeda
morphed from a bureaucratic, hierarchical organization into an ideological umbrella for loosely
coupled jihadi networks (Mishal et al. 2005). We argue that the changing environment pressured the
Al Qaeda leadership into adopting network topologies that maintain secrecy while simultaneously
3providing some possibility to coordinate and control. Videotapes of lecture series from the summer
of 2000 show Abu Musab al Suri (Mustafa Setmariam Nasar) explicitly discussing (and providing
critique of) hierarchical network structures (Bergen 2006, Cruickshank 2007). Ideally the network
should consist of small autonomous cells with limited strategic guidance. However, it is known
that in reality there still exist weak bonds between local groups and experienced jihadists or Al
Qaeda operatives, such was the case for instance in the Madrid and London attacks (Vidino 2006).
What is important is the fact that current covert organizations de¯nitely take the secrecy versus
operational e±ciency dilemma explicitly into account.
The examples above show that it is important for a covert organization to take the network
structure explicitly into account. Operation Susannah and CIA's East Berlin operation illustrated
that failing to do this may result in failure of the operation. It appears that current terrorist
organizations take their network structure explicitly into account as the example of Al Qaeda shows.
In absence of further information we are interested in what structure these organizations actually
adopt. In Lindelauf et al. (2008) a theoretical framework for the analysis of the communication
structure of covert networks was given. The optimal network structure was derived considering one
of several scenarios. Below we recapitulate the theoretical framework and present the main results.
Imagine two agents, one responsible for network secrecy and the other one for information
e±ciency, bargaining over the set Gn of connected graphs of given order n. The information





The secrecy measure S(g) of a graph g 2 Gn is de¯ned as the expected fraction of the network that
remains unexposed under the assumption of exposure probability of individual i 2 V being equal
to ®i. The fraction of the network that individual i exposes (including himself) is de¯ned to be





The tradeo® between secrecy and information is modeled as a game theoretic bargaining prob-
lem. Hence, the optimal graph in the sense of the Nash bargaining solution is the graph g 2 Gn
that maximizes
¹(g) = S(g)I(g): (3)
Two scenarios are considered in
Lindelauf et al.(2008). In the ¯rst scenario it is assumed that the probability of exposure of
an individual in the organization is uniform over all network members, i.e., ®i = 1
n. Additionally
it is assumed that the fraction of the network that individual i exposes is equal to the expected
number of neighbors that will be detected if communication on links is detected independently and
identically with probability p, i.e., we set 1¡ui =
pdi+1
n . The main result is that for a low value of
p the complete graph is optimal and for a high value of p the star graph is optimal:
Theorem 3.1
(i) If p 2 [0; 1
2], then ¹(gn
comp) ¸ ¹(g) for all g 2 Gn ,
(ii) If p 2 [1
2;1], then ¹(gn
star) ¸ ¹(g) for all g 2 Gn.
4As an illustration consider the network structure of the former Dutch National Clandestine
Service's so-called `stay behind organization'. After the Second World War it was decided that
precautionary measures should be taken such that in the event of a sudden invasion of the Nether-
lands a covert organization would be present to assist in subversive and covert activities to support
the overthrow of the occupying forces (Engelen 2005). This covert organization was divided into
two groups: group A and B. Support group `A' consisted of single agents all equipped with radio
systems to connect to the Allied Clandestine Base (ACB). These single agents were not aware of
each other because the chosen network structure equalled that of a star graph. Due to the extreme
covert nature of this network (which was ¯nally disbanded after the end of the Cold War in 1992)
the initial exposure probability of network members may be assumed to be uniform. Communi-
cating with the ACB presented a high link detection probability (high value for p) hence it can
be argued that the star network design was an optimal choice. However, after operating for an
extended period of time the exposure probability of the single agents would not be uniform anymore
but would start to depend on their `activity' in exchange of information. This alternative scenario
is also analyzed in Lindelauf et al. (2008).
In the second scenario it is assumed that the probability of exposure of an individual in the
network g 2 G(n;m) depends on his centrality with regard to the exchanging of information in the
network. It is argued that setting ®i = di+1
2m+n for all i 2 V is an adequate choice. The optimal
networks for low order graphs are presented in ¯gure 2.
Figure 2: Optimal graphs for n 2 f2;:::;7g.
Optimal graphs for larger order were approximated by computer simulation and are presented
in ¯gure 3. Generally speaking it can be seen that cellular structures emerge: each individual is
connected to a limited member of network members.
Figure 3: Approximate optimal graphs for n=25 (left) and n=40 (right).
54 Jemaah Islamiya Bali bombing
In this section we analyze an organization that faced the tradeo® between secrecy and operational
e±ciency. In doing this we put the theoretical framework of Lindelauf et al.(2008) to the test.
We analyze how this organization dealt with this tradeo® by studying and comparing the network
structure that they adopted to the theoretical framework.
Jemaah Islamiya started as an Indonesian Islamist group and is a loosely structured organization
characterized by four territorial divisions (mantiqis) corresponding to peninsular Malaysia and
Singapore; Java; Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi; and Australia and Papua (Koschade 2006).
Abdullah Sungkar, motivated by the need for a new organisation that could work to achieve an
Islamic State in Indonesia, started JI in Malaysia around 1995. Al Qaeda in¯ltrated JI during
the 1990's and JI subsequently developed into a pan-Asian network extending from Malaysia and
Japan in the north to Australia in the south (Gunaratna 2002). By doing this Al Qaeda set out to
link these groups into a truly transnational network (Abuza 2003).
The tactical operation of the Bali attack that was conducted by Jemaah Islamiyah's Indonesian
cell is described in Koschade (2006). The attack was carried out on October 12, 2002, by having
a ¯rst operative explode a vest of explosives in Paddy's bar. This caused people to °ood to the
streets, which triggered the second attack by a vehicle based improvised explosive (VBIED) of
about 1000 kilograms of TNT and ammonium nitrate. Consequently 202 people were killed. The
operational setting consisted of a team of bomb builders located in a safe-house, a separate support
team split over two safe-houses and a command team. The individuals in the safe-houses were
thoroughly aware of the need for secrecy. This is indicated by the fact that each member used their
Balinese alias and that communication occurred in code words. The individuals in the safe-houses
rarely left these houses and used methods to reduce the probability of link detection: they only
communicated by SMS and they changed their sim cards frequently. Hence, due to the similarity
of these individuals from the viewpoint of secrecy the probability of exposure of those individuals
may be assumed to be uniform. In terms of the theoretical framework by Lindelauf et al. (2008)
described in the earlier section the setting in which these individuals operated re°ects the ¯rst
scenario. Hence, the actual subgraph corresponding to these individuals is best compared to the
results obtained for this scenario.
To coordinate the operation a command team consisting of ¯ve individuals was set up. The
operational commanders were highly active with regard to exchange of information. Hence the
setting in which the command team members operated ¯ts best to the second scenario of the
theoretical framework. Hence we compare the actual subgraph corresponding to these individuals
to the theoretical results obtained for the second scenario in Lindelauf et al. (2008).
Koschade (2006) presents the actual network of this operation as provided in ¯gure 4. It is
this graph that we use as basis for comparison with the theoretical framework presented earlier.
We partition the network into three subnetworks corresponding to the groups of individuals with
intrinsically di®erent goals. The Bali Bombing cell can be split into the bomb making team (cell 18),
the support team (team Lima) and the command team. It can be seen that cell 18 as well as team
Lima adopted the structure of a complete graph. That is, by choosing a location with tight security,
never leaving the house and having someone on guard they tried to lower the exposure probability
and link detection probability as much as possible. Both cells obtained the optimal graph according
to the theoretical framework. The command team visited both cells and coordinated the operation.
The theoretical framework of Lindelauf et al. only considered a homogeneous communica-




Figure 4: Social Network of Jemaah Islamiyah cell that conducted the Bali Operation on October
6, 2002.
Figure 5: JI Command Team (left) and the theoretically optimal command team (right)
Koschade (2006) considered a weighting function on the edges by scaling the frequency and duration
of interaction between 1 and 5. This already indicates that the nature of interaction among individ-
uals in the network is not homogeneous. The frequency and duration of interaction di®ered most
among the members of the subgraph corresponding to the command team. This non-homogeneity
of interactions will be incorporated into the theoretical framework in the next section.
5 A First Approach to Heterogeneity in Covert Networks
An organization conducting a covert operation not only has to consider the communication structure
of its network but also has to take into account that the nature of interaction between individuals is
not homogeneous. For instance, the act of delivering a pre-manufactured bomb to the triggerman
is potentially more dangerous than the internal communication (possibly through codewords) dis-
cussing the planning of an attack. Therefore in this section we will extend the theoretical framework
on covert networks by di®erentiating between the nature of interaction among network individuals.
Two questions come to mind. First, given a network structure which pair of individuals should con-
duct the interaction that presents the highest risk to the organization? Second, given the fact that
there is a pair of individuals conducting an interaction that presents a high risk to the organization
which network structure is optimal?
75.1 The Optimal High Risk Interaction Pair
We consider the situation that the interaction between individuals in the network is not completely
homogeneous. This among others because the frequency, duration and nature of interaction di®ers
between individuals. Hence, certain interactions present a higher risk to the organization than
others. We model this by assigning `weights' to the links, representing the risk of that interaction.
For graph g = (V;E) we de¯ne the weighting function w : E 7! [1;1) such that wij > wkl,
ij;kl 2 E, is interpreted as interaction between individual i and j presenting a higher risk to the
organization than interaction between k and l. Denote the set of all such weighting functions by W.
Explicitly we denote a graph g with weight w 2 W assigned to its edges by g(w). The interpretation
of this weighting function forces us to adjust the de¯nition of secrecy. The information measure
needs not to be adapted: one either interacts with an individual or not. However, risky interactions
provide an enhanced security threat to the organization.
We adjust the secrecy measure corresponding to the second scenario in Lindelauf et al. (2008).
For g 2 G(n;m) we again set ui = 1¡ di+1
n but adjust the probability of detection of an individual.
This probability of detection not only depends on the number of individuals this individual is
connected to but also on the nature of that interaction. Let wi =
P
j2¡i(g) wij where ¡i(g) = fj 2








Motivated by the fact that a risky interaction increases the relative probability of exposure of an
individual we set ®i = wi+1
W+n. In case wij = 1 for all ij 2 E, ®i reduces to the one in Lindelauf et
al.(2008), i.e., ®i = di+1





It can be seen that the secrecy measure of a graph g is the expected fraction of the network
that survives upon exposure of an individual in the network according to probability distribution
(®i)i2V . It is easily derived that
S(g) =





It follows that S(gn
comp) = 0. Slightly more general for any k-regular graph g 2 Gn it holds that




T(g) we ¯nd that,
¹(g) = S(g)I(g) =
(n ¡ 1)
T(g)
























n(n+1) if n is odd
4(n¡3)(n¡1)
n3 if n is even
8Due to the symmetry of gring and gstar the interaction that presents the highest risk can be
conducted by any pair of individuals. This can also be seen directly from lemma 5.1. In addition we
determine the optimal location of the highest risk interaction for the path graph. The best position
(in terms of maximizing ¹) in the path graph is between either pair of individuals such that one
of these individuals is an endpoint of the path. So, if the path is given by 1;2;:::;n ¡ 1;n w12 or
wn¡1n is maximal. Thus an organization structured as a path graph does best by having either
pair of players conducting the risky interaction as far away as possible from the central players.
This is in accordance with intuition.
In general it is shown that the pair of individuals in the organization that should conduct the
interaction that presents the highest risk to the organization is the pair that is the least connected
to the remainder of the network.
Theorem 5.1 Let g = (V;E) 2 G(n;m) and fklg = argminij2E (di+dj). Set ^ wkl = W ¡(m¡1),
^ wij = 1 for all ij 2 E n fklg. Then ¹(g( ^ w)) > ¹(g(w)) for all w 2 W with
P
ij2E wij = W.
Proof: It can be seen from equation 5 that, given a graph g 2 G(n;m) and total weight
W =
P
ij2E wij, maximizing ¹(g) is equal to minimizing
P
i2V diwi. It readily follows that P
i2V diwi =
P
ij2E wij(di + dj), hence the result follows. 2
Given the situation that only a single interaction presents a higher risk to the organization we
now compare the optimal path, star and ring graph using these results. We analyze the situation of
a slightly riskier interaction (z = 2) and the situation of a much more riskier (z = 100) interaction.
The results are summarized in ¯gure 6. The ring graph is always dominated. It can be seen that








































Figure 6: A comparison between star, path and ring graph for z=2 (top) and z=100 (bottom).
for low values of n the path has a higher value of ¹ than the star graph. At a certain value of n a
9transition occurs such that ¹(gn
path) becomes smaller than ¹(gn
star). In case of z = 2 this transition
occurs at n = 11. In case z = 100 this transition occurs at n = 18. Thus it can be seen that the
amount of risk an interaction poses to the organization in°uences this transition point. For instance
imagine one has to consider an organizational form that either is very centralized (star graph) or
decentralized (path graph). If the number of individuals in the organization, n, is very large the
star graph is the better choice. This can be understood intuitively because of the di±culty of
information exchange in large path graphs as opposed to star graphs. However, if there is a single
interaction that is much more risky relative to the others it still is advantageous to adopt a path
graph organizational form. Clearly, this reduces the capability to process information but from the
perspective of secrecy has the advantage of reducing the risk to the organization by positioning the
risky interaction as far away as possible from the central players.
5.2 Approximating Optimal Heterogeneous Covert Networks
In section 5.1 it was established that if there exists exactly one pair of individuals that conduct an
interaction that presents a high risk to the organization they should have the least connection to
the remainder of the network (theorem 5.1). In this section we are interested in which connected
graph g 2 Gn should be adopted given the fact that the pair of individuals i;j 2 V conducting the
risky interaction is the one that minimizes di +dj. We approximate the graphs that are optimal in
this respect by simulation.
We conducted a greedy optimization algorithm as follows.




Value of risky interaction z.
Number of times edges are added m.
Initialization:
¹ g = ginitial. (Denote ¹ g = (V;E)).
¹(ghelp) = 0.
Iteration 1:
For i = 1:m
Iteration 2:
For kl 2 Ec
Step 1. Set g0 = ¹ g [ kl.
Step 2. Determine i;j 2 g0 such that di + dj is minimal and locate z at this link.
Step 3. Compute ¹(g0).
Step 4. If ¹(g0) > ¹(ghelp) set ghelp = g0:
End iteration 2.





10The best results of this greedy optimization are presented in table 1 for graphs of order 4 ·
n · 10. The location of the pair of individuals that conduct the interaction that presents a high
risk to the organization is presented in bold.








Table 1: Approximate optimal graphs with single high risk interaction, z = 2, indicated in bold.
As a further illustration optimal graphs of larger order are approximated by using the greedy
optimization algorithm, see ¯gure 7. It can be seen that cellular structures emerge around a
centralized individual. Comparing these to ¯gure 3 it can be seen that the networks in ¯gure 7 are
less dense. In addition it can be seen that the individuals conducting the interaction that presents
the highest risk to the organization are members of a cell with limited connectivity to the remainder
of the network.
11Figure 7: Approximate optimal graphs for n=25 (left) and n=40 (right).
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